Why the melon-cutting? by Anonymous
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Haskins and Sells Publications Deloitte Collection
1922
Why the melon-cutting?
Anonymous
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_hs
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Haskins and Sells
Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Haskins & Sells Bulletin, Vol. 05, no. 11 (1922 November 15), p. 85-86
Bulletin HASKINS & SELLS 85 
Why the Melon-cutting? 
W H E N a unique event affecting some 
one business organization occurs, it 
is customary to attribute the event to some 
internal cause more or less associated with 
the organization in question. But when 
one corporation follows another in action 
of the same character, it is only natural to 
seek the reason in some outside source. 
The recent series of stock dividends on 
the part of companies in the oil group is 
not a coincidence. There is undoubtedly 
some motive for the action. And the 
motive seems to be found largely in the fear 
of prospective legislation affecting taxation. 
When the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided that stock dividends are not 
taxable as income, it practically check-
mated the government in its battle with 
tax-payers. The decision was a great 
victory for the latter, not only moral but 
financial. Citizens today, who are for-
tunate enough to be recipients of stock 
dividends, pay a tax only on the profit 
attaching to such of the shares as they sell. 
Corporations at present probably have 
nothing to fear from a large surplus. The 
fear lies in future legislation which may 
make some attempt to tax undistributed 
profits in excess of the needs of the business. 
But what constitutes the needs of the busi-
ness will doubtless be a bigger problem to 
solve than some of those already encoun-
tered in connection with invested capital. 
As to the stock dividend decision, the 
government is concerned, not with the 
effect on the corporation, since the cor-
poration pays the tax on profits earned 
and accumulated, but with the effect on 
the taxation of the individual where the 
corporation piles up surplus and then dis-
tributes it as stock dividends. As accumu-
lated surplus distributed through the 
medium of a stock dividend, profits pro-
duce no revenue to the government from 
the individuals who receive them because, 
in effect, while there is a rearrangement of 
share ownership, the profits remain in the 
business as additional share capital. That 
taxation in the hands of recipient stock-
holders would be double taxation, and 
obviously unfair, seems to have the support 
of the Supreme Court. 
There is much agitation over the recent 
action of the oil companies, because of the 
appearance of evasion which the action 
has. Declaring stock dividends and issuing 
shares representing such dividends results 
in putting into the hands of a shareholder 
something of value which he did not have 
before, for which he gave nothing, which 
is an earning on his investment, and which 
he may sell for cash. This, it is claimed, 
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is but another way of distributing profits. 
And the argument has some force, except 
that it would be rather hazardous to the 
price of the stock were all shareholders to 
sell the shares received as a stock dividend. 
On profits distributed one way the govern-
ment collects a tax; distributed the other 
way the government gets nothing unless 
some of the shares involved are sold. 
With the grief generated by this last 
thought in mind certain persons, whether 
for reasons political or otherwise, have 
sought to invoke section 220 of the Revenue 
Act of 1921 as a means of penalizing the 
companies recently so affluent as to declare 
large stock dividends. The section in 
question is aimed particularly at holding 
companies formed or availed of for the 
purpose of preventing the imposition of a 
surtax through the accumulation of profits 
instead of a division or distribution thereof, 
and provides as a penalty an additional 
tax of 25 per cent. Other parts of the 
section leave such grave doubts about the 
administration of the law as to bring its 
practicability into question. For example: 
"The fact that any corporation is a mere 
holding company, or that the gains and 
profits are permitted to accumulate beyond 
the reasonable needs of the business, shall 
be prima facie evidence of a purpose to 
escape the surtax; but the fact that gains 
and profits are in any case permitted to 
accumulate and become surplus shall not 
be construed as evidence of a purpose to 
escape the tax in such case, unless the 
Commissioner certifies that in his opinion 
such accumulation is unreasonable for the 
purposes of the business." 
What Congress will in the future do 
with the tax law is perhaps an open ques-
tion. That some legislator, or faction of 
influence, will urge strongly some measure 
taxing undistributed profits is almost a 
foregone conclusion. Some corporations 
are taking no chances. 
